



# Environmental, Extremist, Economic: New Challenges to International Security

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## African Union Peace and Security Council

Official Study Guide

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## Words of Welcome

Most honourable representatives of the African Union Peace and Security Council,

It is our utmost pleasure to welcome you to BerInMUN 2018, and more importantly, to the African Union Peace and Security Council. We are sure that this will be an outstanding experience for everyone involved and hope we can make the most of this conference.

The times we are living in are of great relevance for the future of our world. It is with a spirit of resolution and strive that we face the debate at the Peace and Security Council of BerInMUN 2018. We stand at crossroads in many issues and we must bear in mind that the things we do today will shape how we stand tomorrow.

This idea ties in with the theme of BerInMUN 2018: “Environmental, Extremist, Economic: New Challenges to International Security”.

Climate change, frozen conflicts and rising international terrorism are present and future threats for our international community. Populist movements call for more protectionism and isolationism while demonizing immigration. It is our responsibility to shape the future we want. It is clearly not a Model United Nations Conference where the future is decided. But every time you try to find solutions for various problems you become a bit more sensitive for them. And more sensitivity in our society is the first step for a better future. The proposed topics for the Council’s agenda follow this idea of acting today to help tomorrow.

The following Study Guide should serve as a guideline for the topics and you should read it carefully. To ensure a high-level discussion it is crucial to collect all useful information about your country, the topic and your country’s foreign relations.

Lastly, we would like to remind you that you can always contact us if you have any questions or concerns. We are looking forward meeting you in Berlin.

Best Regards,

Lena Stránská and Franz Lentner

## Committee Overview – African Union Peace and Security Council

The African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) was not planned for when the African Union replaced the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 2002. Its creation was proposed in 2001 at a summit in Lusaka and its establishing Protocol entered into force late in 2003.<sup>1</sup> Its first meeting took place in March 2004.<sup>2</sup> The AUPSC is the



Source: [Google](#).

successor to the rather ineffective OAU's Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution.<sup>3</sup> It also shares many similarities with the UN Security Council. It is created as an independently-standing organ responsible for prevention, management and resolution of conflicts on the continent. Furthermore, it is a collective security and early-warning body ensuring an appropriate, efficient and timely response to crisis situations in Africa.<sup>4</sup>

### Functions, Powers, Procedures, Agenda

Key powers of the AUPSC are listed in Article 7 of the AUPSC Founding Protocol. They include but are not limited to: instituting of sanctions; the undertaking of peacemaking and peacebuilding; the anticipation and prevention of disputes, conflicts and policies that may lead to genocide and crimes against humanity; the recommendation of

<sup>1</sup> Vines, A. *A Decade of African Peace and Security Architecture*, 2013, P. 96.

<sup>2</sup> Makinda, S. M., Okumu, F. W., *The African Union: Challenges of globalization, security and governance*, 2008, P. 48.

<sup>3</sup> Tiekou, T.K. *The African Union*, 2013, P. 35; Peaceau.org, 2018.

<sup>4</sup> AUPSC Protocol, 2002, P. 4-5.

intervention in respect to grave circumstances; the promotion of coordination between regional mechanisms and the AU; or the support and facilitation of humanitarian actions.<sup>5</sup>

The Council's meetings are organized to be able to function continuously, and its members are required to keep a permanent presence at AU HQ in Addis Ababa. The meetings can be held at three levels that have different frequency of meeting. Permanent representatives meet at least twice a month, the other two instances – Ministers and Heads of State/Government – meet at least once a year. The chairmanship of the Council is rotational based on the English alphabet. Chairs rotate every month.<sup>6</sup>

Besides chairing the sessions, the chairperson is also responsible for drafting the agenda. They can bring the Council's attention to any matter that may threaten peace, security and stability in the continent. It is frequently based on proposals submitted by Chairperson of the Commission or individual Member States. When deciding, the Council is guided by the principle of consensus. If this proves impossible, two-third majority voting on substantive matters and simple majority voting on procedural questions are allowed.<sup>7</sup>

In order to seek expertise on any issue, the Council may establish Subsidiary bodies. Already in the AUPSC Protocol, the creation of the Military Staff Committee (MSC) was foreseen. Together with the African Standby Force, Early Warning System, African Peace Fund and Panel of the Wise, the MSC is part of the African Peace and Security Architecture. The MSC advises the AUPSC on all issues relating to military and security with respect to promotion of peace in Africa. All AUPSC members have their military

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<sup>5</sup> AUPSC Protocol, 2002, P. 8-11; Makinda, S. M., Okumu, F. W., 2008, P. 48.; Vines, A. 2013, P. 97.

<sup>6</sup> AUPSC Protocol, 2002, P. 11-12; 14-15.

<sup>7</sup> AUPSC Protocol, 2002, P. 11-14.

representatives in the MSC.<sup>8</sup> Besides the MSC, there is also a permanent Council of Experts serving as a subsidiary of the AUPSC.

### **Membership of the Council**

Structure of the AUPSC partly mirrors the Security Council of the United Nations. It consists of fifteen Members elected by the AU Executive Council and endorsed by the Assembly. There is a country matrix determining how many countries per region can take up their seat. Two seats are ascribed to Northern Africa, three to Central, Eastern and Southern Africa and four to Western Africa. Besides that, there should be consensus on national rotation within respective regions so that all countries get the chance of being on the Council. Despite this matrix, however, there are countries who have been on the Council more frequently than others. The reasons for this vary from size of the region that enables more frequent rotation to problematic political and economic situation preventing respective countries from fulfilling the selection criteria. Countries serving on the Council should contribute to promotion and maintenance of peace and security in Africa, should participate in conflict resolution, peacemaking and peacebuilding, should be willing to take responsibility for regional or continental conflict resolution initiatives, should be committed to AU financial obligations and should respect constitutional governance, rule of law and human rights.<sup>9</sup>

There are no permanent seats on the Council. Five countries are elected for three years, whereas the remaining ten only for two years. Current Members of the Council are Angola, Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Liberia, Morocco, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Togo, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Morocco, Togo, Sierra

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<sup>8</sup> AUPSC Protocol, 2002, P. 16-21; Vines A., 2013, P. 97.

<sup>9</sup> AUPSC Protocol, 2002, P. 7-8.

Leone, Liberia, Djibouti, Rwanda, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Angola and Zimbabwe were all elected in January 2018 for two-year terms.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Institute for Security Studies, *30th AU summit: PSC members elected by consensus*, 2018.

## TOPIC A: The Situation in Burundi – Internal Crisis in a Fragile Region

### Introduction

Since early 2015, Burundi has been facing a political crisis. What started as the President's decision to run for the third time in office ended up with massive demonstrations, killings, detentions, closed universities and cut telephone and internet services. Those opposing the President are called terrorists and around half a million



Source: [Lonely Planet](#).

people have already fled the country. The situation was also worsened by an attempted coup d'état from May 2015 that fell apart only few hours after being proclaimed. Furthermore, human rights violations are being reported from the country. As of 2018, there are no improvements to be reported. Press and universities are being controlled by the government, the President is hoping to stay in power until 2034 (if re-elected in 2020) and refugee camps across the borders make Burundi's neighbors worry about their own security and stability.

So far, there have been two notable attempts to solve the crisis. First, in May 2015, Tanzania hosted an emergency conference where also Burundian President Pierre Nkurunziza was present. The attempted coup d'état, however, cut the conference short preventing it from delivering any results. Second, the AUPSC has authorized a peace operation in December 2015 threatening to invoke Article 4(h) of the AU Charter that allows it to intervene in case of grave circumstances. Burundi, however, refused any mission. Furthermore, as it later turned out, not all countries within the AU were ready

to support such an operation. The International Criminal Court also threatened to open and later really opened an investigation against Burundian authorities. Burundi reacted with its withdrawal from the organization, becoming the first country in history to really have withdrawn from the institution.<sup>11</sup>

Although most of the events in Burundi are of internal nature, there are two reasons why it also needs to be considered from the regional or continental perspective. Firstly, there are about half a million refugees in Rwanda, Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. These countries are starting to worry about security and stability in their border regions. Considering that the Great Lakes region belongs to ethnically unstable states, this is an issue that needs to be approached with great urgency and caution. Secondly, on several occasions, rhetoric in Burundi has shown similarities to that heard in Rwanda during genocide in 1994.<sup>12</sup>

## Historical Background

### *Turbulent Post-Independence Years*

Until 1959, Burundi was part of Belgian colony Ruanda-Urundi. Motivated by Rwandan Revolution, Burundi also raised demands for independence and successfully gained it July 1<sup>st</sup>, 1962.<sup>13</sup> Within the first five years of independence, two coups d'état took place. The second one succeeded and turned Burundi into a republic with Tutsi leadership. The country became a military dictatorship following the ideology of African socialism, relying heavily on support from China.<sup>14</sup>

Second half of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s represented a prequel to the first Burundian Genocide. On April 27<sup>th</sup>, 1972, Hutu members of the gendarmerie started a

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<sup>11</sup> BBC, *Burundi Profile – Timeline*, 2018

<sup>12</sup> Manirakiza, P. *The Genocide Rhetoric in Burundi*, 2016.

<sup>13</sup> US Department of State, *U.S. Relations with Burundi*, 2017.

<sup>14</sup> BBC, 2018.

rebellion that led to over one thousand dead Tutsi and moderate Hutu. Furthermore, the last king returned from exile and was murdered two days later, on April 29<sup>th</sup>. These two events prompted the government to send out the Tutsi led military to restore order. Despite its orders, the army committed mass atrocities against Hutu, leaving between 80 and 210 thousand deaths and a similar number of refugees and displaced persons.<sup>15</sup>

A bloodless coup in 1976 ousted mentally ill President Micombero out of power and instituted a one-party state with strongly limited civil and religious freedoms. Another coup, also Tutsi lead, followed in 1987. Constitution was suspended, parties dissolved and military rule was reinstated.<sup>16</sup> President Pierre Buyoya tried to introduce reforms that would ease state control over media and would support national dialogue. A new constitution in 1992 also reacted to calls for equal representation of both ethnics. These reforms, however, made Hutu believe that long-lived oppression by Tutsi was over which ignited local revolts in the North of the country. Just as in 1972, instead of restoring control, the army sent out to restore control murdered thousands of Hutus.<sup>17</sup>

#### *Civil War 1993-2005*

Burundian civil war was a 13-years long conflict following democratic elections in 1993. In June 1993, the FRODEBU party (Hutu) won the general election, formed a government and its leader, Melchior Ndadaye, became the first President of Hutu descent. On October 21<sup>st</sup>, 1993, Ndadaye was assassinated by a Tutsi which lead to a direct attack on Tutsi, the so called second Burundian Genocide, leaving behind up to 100 thousand deaths.<sup>18</sup> The UN reported that these events bore signs of genocide and that there was also high-level army involvement in Ndadaye's assassination.

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<sup>15</sup> Lemarchand, R. *Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide*, 1996, p. XXV; BBC, 2018; Political Economy Research Institute, *Modern Conflicts: Conflict Profile – Burundi (1993-2006)*, 2018, p. 1.

<sup>16</sup> Rule, S. *Burundi's President Is Ousted by Army*, 1987.

<sup>17</sup> BBC, 2018.

<sup>18</sup> Lemarchand, R. 1996, p. XV; BBC, 2018; Political Economy Research Institute, 2018, p. 1.

No other year of the Civil War was as bloody as 1993. Despite that, reaching a peace agreement was a lengthy process. Arusha peace talks started in June 1998. Nelson Mandela entered the negotiation in 2000 and contributed to facilitation of an agreement that established a transitional government based on rotational power-sharing.<sup>19</sup> Two leading Hutu groups refused to sign the document, but the transitional government was implemented in October 2001 nonetheless. To show its dissatisfaction, leading rebel groups escalated violence and in April 2001 attempted to overthrow the government.<sup>20</sup>

In July 2003 Domitien Ndayishimiye took over the government presidency from Pierre Nkurunziza. In the same month, a major bomb attack took place in the Bujumbura, leaving 300 dead and 15000 displaced civilians. In November 2001, President Ndayishimiye achieved a breakthrough, when he and representatives of the main rebel group – FDD – signed a ceasefire agreement.<sup>21</sup> As a result, FDD became a political party and Hutu fighters were integrated into the predominantly Tutsi national armed forces. This later turned into a law that modified the character of the army, involving all but one Hutu rebel group.

During spring 2005, the new constitution was adopted after being previously approved by a nation-wide referendum.<sup>22</sup> In July 2005, FDD dominated the parliamentary elections and later that year, the parliament elected Pierre Nkurunziza President. Another positive moment occurred when the last Hutu rebel group, the FNL, agreed to sign a ceasefire.<sup>23</sup> Although heavy fighting was over since 2005, economically, the situation in Burundi was and remains to be very bad. Burundi's GDP per capita remains

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<sup>19</sup> BBC, 2018.

<sup>20</sup> United Nations, *Security Council Welcomes Burundi's Transitional Government, Condemns Attacks on Civilian, in Presidential Statement*, 2001.

<sup>21</sup> BBC, 2018.

<sup>22</sup> IRIN, *Burundi: National clears constitutional referendum, looks ahead to presidential poll*, 2005.

<sup>23</sup> BBC, 2018.

to be one of the lowest in the world.<sup>24</sup> The country is dependent on coffee exports whose world market price is highly volatile. Socio-economic cleavage, if not dealt with, might become a source of future clashes.

## Key Issues

### *National and Regional Ethnic Tensions; Refugees*

Ethnic tensions have been defining Burundian society since its independence. All coups d'état were led by either one of the ethnic groups. The country also experienced two large-scale atrocities. Although current tensions are less ethnical than before, when put into regional context, ethnic issues might become an additional source of conflict and should not be overlooked. The Great Lakes region has suffered great ethnic tensions in the past, escalating in 1994 in Rwanda. Currently, there are at least half a million Burundian refugees of both ethnicities in Rwanda, Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The host countries are beginning to worry that hosting refugees might lead to tensions and violent clashes on their soil.<sup>25</sup>

Furthermore, refugee camps tend to be bases of opposition or terrorist groups. When fighting emerged in the North of Burundi in July 2015, Burundian government was quick to blame its Rwandan counterparts and camps on their side of the border. On a similar note, during one of the most recent attacks on May 11<sup>th</sup>, 2018, the perpetrators are claimed to have come from camps in the DRC.<sup>26</sup> Refugee camps also provide fertile ground for sicknesses. A cholera epidemic has occurred in some of the camps.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> TradingEconomics.com, *GDP per capita*, 2018.

<sup>25</sup> AfricaNews.com, *Burundi: 26 people killed by armed men in the northwest*, 2018.

<sup>26</sup> AfricaNews.com, 2018.

<sup>27</sup> Deutsche Welle, *Burundian refugees face cholera threat in Tanzania*, 2015.

### *Constitutional Changes*

Burundian constitution used to be changed when convenient and recent events suggest this situation will not be an exemption. Already in 2015 constitutionality of the third term was questioned. Although the President's running for office was approved, it occurred under dubious circumstances, when four out of the Court's seven judges left Burundi before the final judgment, claiming death threats.<sup>28</sup> Recently, another constitutional issue has become part of public debate. On May 17<sup>th</sup>, 2018 a constitutional referendum took place (for more information see below). Among others, it prolongs the President's mandate to seven years, while limiting it to two consecutive terms. At the same time, it enables the incumbent to run again, despite currently serving his third term.<sup>29</sup>

### *Human rights abuses*

Since early May 2015, human rights abuses are reported from Burundi. Most of them are related to unlawful detentions and torture of those detained. Those affected by this belong to prominent figures in Burundian society and politics, such as human rights activist Pierre Claver Mbonimpa or a local AFP correspondent investigating murder of chief of presidential security. Key figures of the attempted coup also bore signs of beating when in court in May 2015.<sup>30</sup> As a reaction to this, the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) has set up a Commission of Inquiry mandated to investigate the allegations and work both with Burundian and AU authorities on improvement of the situation.<sup>31</sup> Human Rights Watch's submission to the Universal Periodic Review

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<sup>28</sup> Al Jazeera, 2015; BBC, 2015b; CGTN, 2015; BBC, 2018.

<sup>29</sup> AfricaNews.com, 2018

<sup>30</sup> AfricaNews.com, 2018.

<sup>31</sup> OHCHR.org, *Commission of Inquiry on Burundi*, 2018.

published by the UNHRC contains a large list of human rights abuses and other discriminations.<sup>32</sup>

Furthermore, access to human rights such as freedom of speech or freedom of press are highly limited. Prior to the referendum in May 2018, BBC and Voice of America were banned from the country.<sup>33</sup>

## Recent developments

### *Political Crisis since 2015*

The current political crisis started in late April 2015, when the ruling party – FDD – announced that the incumbent President would run for his third term in office. Immediately, protests erupted and lasted for almost three weeks.<sup>34</sup> In reaction, the government shut down national telephone and internet services, closed all universities and called protests an uprising and protesters terrorists.<sup>35</sup> Parallel to the protests, the Constitutional Court was evaluating the constitutionality of the third term. Out of seven judges, four, including the Court’s Vice-President, fled the country claiming death threats. The remaining three judges allowed the President’s participation in the election.<sup>36</sup>



Source: <https://www.afp.com/en/news/826/burundi-backs-constitutional-change-referendum-official-doc-1581zd3>

<sup>32</sup> Human Rights Watch, *Human Rights Watch Submission to the Universal Periodic Review of Burundi*, 2017.

<sup>33</sup> BBC, 2018.

<sup>34</sup> BBC, *Burundi court backs President Nkurunziza on third-term*, 2015.

<sup>35</sup> BBC, *Burundi calls opposition protesers „terrorists“*. 2015.

<sup>36</sup> AlJazeera, *Burundi court „forced“ to validate leader’s third term*, 2015.; BBC, 2015b.; BBC, 2018.

Mid-May 2015, Tanzania offered to host an emergency conference to help Burundi regain stability.<sup>37</sup> President Nkurunziza took part, which was used by leading forces in the army and police, including the Defense Minister, to announce a coup d'état. Although it seemed to have succeeded and gotten the international airport in Bujumbura under control, during the night from 13<sup>th</sup> to 14<sup>th</sup> May, the coup was defeated by loyalists within the army. After returning to the country, Nkurunziza deplored the coup and condemned those threatening Burundian stability.<sup>38</sup> These two events lead to postponement of parliamentary elections by 10 days, presidential elections took place as initially planned – on June 26<sup>th</sup>, 2015.<sup>39</sup> Since the opposition boycotted the polls, President Nkurunziza won without any problems. During his inauguration speech he vowed that if his enemies continued with violence, they would be defeated. These calls, however, did not stop the opposition from violence, and low-intensity violence is omnipresent.<sup>40</sup>

The last big unrest took place mid-December 2015, when military camps and a military school were attacked. Almost 100 people died, most of them among the rebels. Reports emerged that there were also collateral victims, especially young men, but the government denied it.<sup>41</sup> In the aftermath, the AUPSC authorized a peacekeeping mission, MAPROBU, to help settle the situation. The government, however, refused to accept the AU's help and claimed, if such a mission entered Burundi, it would be considered an invasion and the national army would protect the country.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> Marszal, A., Winch, J. *Burundi coup: Explosions in capital as rival groups fight for power – as it happened*, 2015.

<sup>38</sup> Marszal, A., Winch, J., 2015.

<sup>39</sup> BBC, 2018

<sup>40</sup> Manirabarusha, C. *Burundi's Nkurunziza wins presidential vote boycotted by rivals*, 2015.

<sup>41</sup> Reuters, *Burundi military sites attacked, 12 insurgents killed*, 2015.

<sup>42</sup> McCormick, T. *The Burundi Intervention That Wasn't*. 2016.

### *African Union's Attempts to Solve the Crisis*

The AU has not been particularly active when it comes to this crisis. Firstly, after the failed coup d'état in May 2015, the then AU Chairman Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma condemned actions against stability in Burundi and called for return to constitutional order. She also recommended elections planned for June 2015 to be postponed.<sup>43</sup> The second time, the AU was significantly more active. After bomb attacks in Bujumbura in December 2015, the AUPSC authorized a peacekeeping operation MAPROBU.<sup>44</sup> The mission was intended to stay for six months with the possibility of renewal. It was supposed to have the initial strength of 5000 military, police and civilian forces, including human rights observers and military experts. It was predominantly mandated to prevent worsening of the situation, protect civilians and contribute to creation of conditions necessary for holding of the Inter-Burundian dialogue, also elaborated on in the Communiqué.<sup>45</sup>

To ensure the mission's deployment, the AUPSC threatened to invoke Article 4(h) of the AU Charter if Burundi did not authorize the mission in 96 hours.<sup>46</sup> Burundi strongly refused any mission and stated that any attempt to enter the country would be considered an invasion obliging the national army to defend the country.<sup>47</sup> It later turned out that since the mission was not fully in accordance with some of the Member States' positions, it would not have received sufficient backing in the AU Assembly in the first place. Since then, the AUPSC has limited itself to verbal reactions based on reports from its Special Rapporteurs and other informants.

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<sup>43</sup> CGTN Africa, *EXCLUSIVE: AU chair, Dlamini-Zuma, speaks on Burundi crisis*, 2015.

<sup>44</sup> McCormick, T. 2016.

<sup>45</sup> African Union Peace and Security Council, *Communiqué DLXV*, 2015, p. 4-5.

<sup>46</sup> African Union, *Constitutive Act of the African Union*, 2000, p. 6.

<sup>47</sup> McCormick, T. 2016.

### *Referendum in May 2018*

The constitutional referendum is a follow-up on previous constitutional modifications that allowed President Nkurunziza to run for the third time and lifted the limit on terms one person may serve as President. Although proposals voted about reintroduce limitations about the number of terms, they also prolong the term by two years to the total of seven and allow President Nkurunziza to run again. This means that if re-elected in 2020, he could hold power until 2034.<sup>48</sup> Furthermore, the referendum reintroduces the office of Prime Minister, lowers the number of Vice-Presidents to one and reduces the majority necessary to pass legislation.<sup>49</sup>

Campaign before the referendum was limited to two weeks prior the referendum. Calls by the opposition for people to boycott the voting as it clearly sabotages the Arusha Accord, were made illegal. Prior to the referendum, on May 11<sup>th</sup>, at least 26 people were killed at the North-East of the country. Militia from the DRC are claimed to be behind the attacks.<sup>50</sup>

On Friday, May 18<sup>th</sup>, preliminary results of the referendum were made public. For the changes to be adopted, it was required to have reached over 50 % of overall support. In 14 out of 18 provinces, the result was reported to be an overwhelming “yes” to suggested changes.<sup>51</sup> The remaining four provinces were not as clear. In provinces where the ruling party struggles to win elections, the “yes” vote passed the 50 % mark only by a small margin.<sup>52</sup> The voter turnout stood over 90 %. Results were officially made public on Monday, May 21<sup>st</sup>. 73 % of the voters had voted yes and 19 % no. The

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<sup>48</sup> AfricaNews.com, 2018.

<sup>49</sup> Al Jazeera, *Burundi prepares for referendum on presidential terms*, 2018.

<sup>50</sup> AfricaNews.com, 2018.

<sup>51</sup> Al Jazeera, *Burundi opposition leader reflects referendum ahead of result*, 2018.

<sup>52</sup> News24.com, *“Yes” votes ahead in Burundi constitutional referendum*, 2018.

final turnout stood by 96 %.<sup>53</sup> The Constitutional Court confirmed them within nine days after the elections.<sup>54</sup>

The referendum was accompanied by many controversies. Many sources including Human Rights Watch reported that some people were forced to vote. If they did not, beating or arrest were used as threats. At least 15 people are estimated to have been killed, others raped or abducted.<sup>55</sup> Foreign journalists' access to the country has been largely limited.<sup>56</sup> Already before the official results, the opposition has announced it would not recognize the results, calling the entire process a "parody" of a democratic process.<sup>57</sup>

### Questions a resolution should answer

There are several issues that should be addressed during BerlinMUN 2018:

- What possibilities does the AUPSC have when dealing with the crisis?
  - Which one of them is the most viable?
  - Which one has the highest success chances?
  - How can violence be stopped so that only political issues remain to be worked out?
- What can the AU do about refugees in neighboring countries?
- How can the risk of destabilizing the entire region be approached?
- What can the AU do about the reported human rights violations and troubling rhetoric reported from Burundi?

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<sup>53</sup> AFP.com, *Burundi backs constitutional change in referendum: official*, 2018.

<sup>54</sup> The East African, *Burundi vote results due Monday*, 2018.

<sup>55</sup> Al Jazeera, 2018b.; The East African, *As Burundians wait for referendum results HRW says 15 killed in campaigns*, 2018.

<sup>56</sup> The East African, 2018.

<sup>57</sup> Al Jazeera, 2018b.

## Recommended readings

Be very careful regarding quality and content of the texts you work with. It is recommended to work with reliable news outlets providing objective coverage of the issues as they evolve, such as Reuters, BBC or Al Jazeera (see also the Bibliography). Using some regional news, Rwandese or Tanzanian, can also be an option, but mind the risk of bias. Since press is currently highly scrutinized in Burundi, their national newspapers provide only one interpretation of the situation.

We also strongly recommend reading the following:

- Constitutive Act of the African Union.
- Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union.
- BBC Burundi Profile: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13087604>
- Communiqués and Press Releases on Burundi by the AUPSC since eruption of the crisis: <http://www.peaceau.org/en/resource/documents?keywords=Burundi&organ=90&theme=&conflict=&location=&txtEndDate=2018-05-01&txtStartDate=2015-01-01&txtDate=yyyy-mm-dd&orderByDate=newest&orderByDate=alpha-a-z&searchMethod=all&fulltextsearch=0>
- Reports and information collected by the UN Human Rights Council Commission of Inquiry on Burundi: <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/ColBurundi/Pages/ColBurundi.aspx>
- Human Rights Watch Reports on Burundi.
- Documents by the AU concerning refugees (at least a brief overview of what the organization has done on the matter): <http://www.peaceau.org/en/resource/documents?keywords=refugees&organ>

[=&theme=&conflict=&location=&txtEndDate=yyyy-mm-dd&txtStartDate=yyyy-mm-dd&txtDate=yyyy-mm-dd&orderByDate=newest&orderByDate=alpha-a-z&searchMethod=all&fulltextsearch=0&p=1](#)

- Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.

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## TOPIC B: Preventing the Ideology of Genocide

### Introduction

It is not a positive outlook that no society that we know in the past or present can live without discrimination.<sup>58</sup> The development of humankind was always accompanied by violence and genocides are a horrible but repeating event in our history.

In Africa many societies are shaped by colonialism and some have experienced genocides. In the post-colonial phase political instability lead to more conflicts within and between African countries. Today the continent is divided into 54 sovereign states, which are often lead by dictators or corrupt governments. The continent has with 1.2 billion people the second largest population (after Asia), but according to estimated data of the International Monetary Fund a nine times smaller total GDP (nominal) than the United States of America.<sup>59</sup> Poverty and the lack of efficient institutions in many countries make Africa to the most instable of all continents.<sup>60</sup> Political, economic and environmental crises are drawbacks for sustainable development. Hate crimes and discrimination spread in the continent while radical groups try to enlarge their influence. This leads not directly to a genocide, but in no continent are there more countries in danger of genocide than in Africa. The international community seems ineffective in its attempt to stabilize countries such as South Sudan or Somalia.

The AUPSC recognized the danger of genocides and therefore adopted a communique on the prevention of the ideology of genocide in its 678th meeting. In this meeting they decided to assemble annually to hold an open meeting on this topic.

This Study Guide describes the evolution of genocides and which concepts are applicable. It also tries to summarize possible preventive measures the AUPSC can take

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<sup>58</sup> Harari, Sapiens, 2011.

<sup>59</sup> IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, 2018.

<sup>60</sup> The Fund for Peace, *Fragile States Index Heat Map*, 2018

and current challenges. Prevention of genocide includes soft and hard power measures, whereas soft power describes educational and dialogue-orientated approaches and hard power describes the usage of military capabilities.

## Historical Background

### *The First Genocide in History*

Ben Kiernan, the current director of the Genocide Studies Program at Yale University, labels the end of the *Tertium Bellum Punicum* ("Third Punic War") as the first genocide in recorded history.<sup>61</sup> The Third Punic War started in 149 BC when Rome declared war against Carthage and ended in 146 BC with the complete destruction of the city Carthage<sup>62</sup>, which is located in today's territory of Tunisia. In the aftermath of the war, many Carthagians died because of starvation and the remaining population was sold into slavery.

### *Colonialism*

The time of colonialism did not only force many cultures into dependency, it was also accompanied by genocides. Although the fate of many cultures in Asia, the Americas and Africa deserve attention, this Study Guide will not cover all of them and only describe the genocide against the Herero exemplify crimes that happened during the colonial period.

In 1882 Adolf Lüderitz requested protection from the German Empire for a station he intended to build in the South West Bay of today's Namibia. After he received protection he bought land from a national chief and established a city named after him: Lüderitz.<sup>63</sup> In 1884 the German Flag was raised in Deutsch-Südwestafrika ("German South West Africa") and their claimed territory confirmed at the Berlin Conference. 20 years later, in 1904, the Herero and Nama rebelled against the colonial rule by the German Empire. After the rebellion led by Samuel Maherero and Hendrik Witbooi was defeated, the remaining Ovaherero were forced to flee in the Omaheke

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<sup>61</sup> Kiernan, *The First Genocide*, 2004.

<sup>62</sup> UNESCO, *General History of Africa*, 1981.

<sup>63</sup> Gewalt, *Herero heroes: a socio-political history of the Herero of Namibia, 1890–1923*, 2017, p.34.

desert, where most of them died from starvation. An estimated number of 25,000 to 100,000 Hereros and 10,000 Namas died.<sup>64</sup>

### *Genocide in Rwanda*

The Berlin Conference also dramatically shaped the future of Rwanda. Together with its neighboring country Burundi they were assigned to the German Empire, who allied with the Rwandan King and ruled the country through the monarchy system. The Germans favored the Tutsi over the Hutu, because they believed that the Tutsi were the better race.<sup>65</sup> However, the German colonial period was short, because the Belgians took control over Rwanda and Burundi during the First World War<sup>66</sup> Different than the Germans, the Belgians ruled the country more directly, but also favored the Tutsi over the Hutu. In 1935 they introduced Identity Cards to distinguish between Tutsi, Hutu and Twa.

After the Second World War the sympathy of Belgians towards the Hutu increased, especially in the Catholic Church. Catholic missionaries increasingly viewed themselves as responsible for empowering the underprivileged Hutu rather than the Tutsi elite, rapidly leading to the formation of a sizeable Hutu clergy and educated elite that provided a new counterbalance to the established political order.<sup>67</sup> In the following years both the Hutu and the Tutsi made efforts to distinguish themselves from the other party and the conflict peaked in an attack on Dominique Mbonyumutwa, a Hutu chief, by supports of the pro-Tutsi party in 1959. Hutus responded by killing Tutsis, which marked the beginning of the Rwandan Revolution. Belgium now supported the Hutu and replaced most administrative position led by Tutsi with Hutus. In 1962 the country's first president, Grégoire Kayibanda, a Hutu, declared Rwanda's

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<sup>64</sup> Kiernan, *Blood and Soil*, 2007, p. 383.

<sup>65</sup> Jones, *Peacemaking*, 2001, pp. 17-19.

<sup>66</sup> Kiernan, *Blood and Soil*, 2007, p. 555.

<sup>67</sup> Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 1999, pp. 44-45.

independence.<sup>68</sup> Many Tutsi left the country, most of the settled to the neighboring countries Burundi, Zaire, Tanzania and Uganda.

In 1987 the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was founded, a military force established by Rwandan Tutsi exiles descendants and led by Fred Rwigyema. Prior to this founding Rwandan refugees fought with the National Resistance Army in the so called Ugandan Bush War, which resulted in the overthrow of the reigning Milton Obote. Motivated by this victory the RPF then attacked Rwanda. But their invasion was repelled by the Rwandan army, which was supported by military forces of France and Zaire. The leader of the RPF, Rwigyema died and Paul Kagame took over the command, who directed the remaining RPF forces back to Uganda. In the following years the RPF fought a guerrilla war against the Rwandan army until they announced a ceasefire in 1992. However, the situation escalated again in 1993, because extremist Hutu groups began to violate Tutsi and the RPF suspended the peace talks as response. The UN was able to calm down the situation and send in the peacekeeping force United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR).

On the 6<sup>th</sup> April 1994 the Rwandan president Juvénal Habyarimana and the president of Burundi Cyprien Ntaryamira, both Hutu, were assassinated.<sup>69</sup> They both flew in the same airplane, which was shot. Both the Rwandan Patriotic Front and Hutu extremists were blamed for the assassination and it is still unclear who carried out this attack. One day later the 100-day-period of killing started, where 500,000 to 1,000,000 Rwandans were killed.<sup>70</sup> 70% of the Tutsi population were eradicated by Hutu powers. Prior to these atrocities a commander of UNAMIR informed the Under-Secretary-General for peacekeeping Kofi Annan (who became UN Secretary General in 1997 and served in this position until 2006) about the preparation for a genocide. However, the mandate of UNAMIR was established to oversee the implementation of the peace talks and to

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<sup>68</sup> Kiernan, *Blood and Soil*, 2007, p. 557.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid*, p. 559.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 560-563.

mediate between both parties in the civil war by their consent and an intervention in the atrocities would have only been possible by a Member State and not by the UN itself.

As the genocide started, also the RPF withdraw from the ceasefire and attacked the Rwandan government. The RPF, led by Paul Kagame, continuously gained territory while fighting against the Rwandan government forces, who were concentrating on the genocide. On 4<sup>th</sup> July 1994 the RPF defeated government forces in the capital city Kigali.<sup>71</sup> Two weeks later they took the last remaining territory of the government in the northwest of Rwanda and forced them to flee to Zaire. Paul Kagame became president, who remains in his position until today. Although the country is moderately stable today, the massacre remains divisive for the country.

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<sup>71</sup> Ibid, p. 569.

## Key Issues

### *Definition of Genocide*

Although genocides are a repetitive act in the history of humankind, the word genocide was only defined after the Second World War. In 1944 in his book *Axis Rule in occupied Europe* Raphael Lemkin, a Polish-Jewish lawyer and author, used the term genocide, originating from the Greek word *genos* ("people") and the Latin suffix *cide* ("killing"), to describe the Nazi's Mass Killing in Europe.<sup>72</sup> Soon after the end of the Second World War the General Assembly affirmed the term genocide as a crime and in 1948 the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPCG) was established. They were the first institution to legally define genocide as the following:

*"any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; [and] forcibly transferring children of the group to another group."*

### *The Ten Stages of Genocide by Stanton*

It is not very surprising that no generally accepted concept of how genocides develop, nor is the one we are representing in this Guide the only correct theory or free of critique. It is always important to question your sources and the author's intention, in the topic of genocide even more so than in many others. In this case the author Gregory Stanton is the president of Genocidewatch, the coordinating organization of The International Alliance to End Genocide (IAEG).<sup>73</sup> Furthermore, he worked for the US State department and drafted several UN Security Council Resolutions on

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<sup>72</sup> Footnote needed.

<sup>73</sup> Genocide Watch, *About Us*.

genocides. Thus, he clearly is an expert on the topic of genocide, however, his approach is coined by a US-centric view.

Please note that his classification is not necessarily a linear process, but stages can also occur simultaneously:<sup>74</sup>

1. **Classification:** All cultures categorize people and distinguish by ethnicity, race, religion or nationality. According to Stanton bipolar societies that lack mixed categories, such as Rwanda or Burundi, are the most likely to have genocide.
2. **Symbolization:** Our distinction between people is followed by giving names or symbols to the different classifications.
3. **Discrimination:** As the first to stages classification and symbolization are universally human, the third stage is clearly not, and a resulting genocide seems more possible. Discrimination simply means that a dominant group uses its authority to deny the rights of other groups.
4. **Dehumanization:** Logically following the discrimination dehumanization results in one group denying the humanity of the other group.
5. **Organization:** Genocide is always organized, usually by the state, but sometimes it is organized informally or decentralized. An example for decentralized organizations are terrorist groups.
6. **Polarization:** Stanton described polarization as the sixth stage, however, we believe polarization can also be understood as a general problematic, which influences all other stages. Following Stanton's definition polarization drives the organized group(s) further apart and extremists broadcast their hate propaganda.

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<sup>74</sup> Stanton, *The Ten Stages of Genocide*, 2013.

7. **Preparation:** The perpetrator group(s) incite their followers and indoctrinate them with fear of the victim group. They often use euphemisms to cloak their intentions, such as referring to their goals as “purification”.
8. **Persecution:** With the stage of persecution the act of genocide begins. In this stage victims are identified and singled out, ranging from being forced to wear identifying symbols to deportation into concentration camps.
9. **Extermination:** In this stage the mass killing is legally called genocide. It is “extermination” to the killers because they do not believe their victims to be fully human.
10. **Denial:** This final stage according to Stanton always follows a genocide. The perpetrators deny that they committed any crimes, and often blame what happened on the victims. They block investigations of the crimes and continue to govern until driven from power by force, when they flee into exile.<sup>75</sup>

## Recent Developments

While the AUPSC tries to solve or at least calm down current security threats, its possibly biggest task is to anticipate and prevent future security challenges. Both the economic and environmental perspective are rather poor in most of the AU Member States and this results in an increase of extremism. According to the Fragile States Index by the *Fund for Peace* Africa is the most fragile of all continents with South Sudan and Somalia claiming the two highest ranks in the fragility index.<sup>76</sup> Given this problems, the AUPSC acts in most cases reactive and spend many capabilities on its current peacekeeping missions in Somalia and Sudan. However, recently the AUPSC tries to operate more proactive and hence more meetings concerning preventive measures

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<sup>75</sup> Stanton, *The Ten Stages of Genocide*, 2013.

<sup>76</sup> The Fund for Peace, *Fragile States Index Heat Map*, 2018.

were held. One of them which was discussed on 678<sup>th</sup> meeting in April 2017 was “preventing the ideology of genocide”. As you are an attentive reader you may have noticed that April is quite a designated month for this topic. It is indeed the month when the atrocities against the Tutsi in Rwanda started in 1994. In order to remember the brutal massacre and to not repeat mistakes, which were made in the past, the AUPSC decided to assemble annually every April to discuss the prevention of the ideology of genocide. But it is not only a decision to solely establish a commemorative culture, but to find actual solutions to raising hate speech, populism and the risk of genocide.

#### *Filter Bubbles and Fake News*

Dehumanization and polarization are two steps towards a genocide and they are at the same time two phenomena, which are on the rise in many parts of the African continent. One decisive factor are new means of communication and the possibility to distribute radical ideologies more easily via Social Media like Facebook, Twitter, etc. In 2016 one U.S. intelligence officer said: *“I don’t think it is far-fetched to say that the internet is a major reason why ISIS is so successful”*<sup>77</sup> However, not only terrorist groups try to use social networks to spread their ideologies and to recruit new supporters, moderate and liberal groups are using social networks, too. The problem is the segregation between these groups and algorithms, which drive them further apart and create so called polarized filter bubbles.<sup>78</sup>

The second internet phenomenon, which is also increasing polarization in societies, are fake news. While it is heavily discussed in western countries, it is rarely seen in the headlines of African newspapers. However, fake news are a major global problem and with a less developed information infrastructure in comparison to western countries, fake news can hit African countries even harder, e.g. 49% of people in Kenya receive

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<sup>77</sup> Frenkel, *Everything you ever wanted to know about how ISIS uses the Internet*, 2016.

<sup>78</sup> Del Vicario, *The Spreading of misinformation online*, 2016, pp. 5-6.

their news through social networks.<sup>79</sup> The journalist Emmanuel Dupuy concluded: *“The prevalence of social media across Africa provides a valid tool for democratic engagement, but at the same the tool is also being used to erode trust, unfairly damage reputations, and sow division within society”*.<sup>80</sup> It is of vital importance that the African Union supports its Member States in debunking misinformation and the Peace and Security Council must prevent increasing extremism in social media.

#### *Mandate to intervene and the African Standby Force*

Besides soft power implementations against rising extremism in social media, the AUPSC also has the power to use hard power capabilities, such as the African Standby Force (ASF), to prevent genocide. One major contributor to the concept of genocide prevention was the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, who outlined a possible action plan to prevent genocide in 2004:

- 1) Prevent armed conflict, which usually provides the context for genocide;
- 2) Protect civilians in armed conflict, including through UN peacekeepers;
- 3) End impunity through judicial action in national and international courts;
- 4) Gather information and set up an early-warning system; and
- 5) Take swift and decisive action, including military action.<sup>81</sup>

While the Secretary General was only partially successful to push forward the doctrine of *Responsibility to Protect*, the African Union made more progress to accommodate his ideas in their constitution, because (as already mentioned in our committee overview) the AUPSC has the right to recommend intervention in a Member State if war crimes, genocide or crimes against humanity violate the guiding principles of the

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
<sup>79</sup> Dupuy, *Social Media and the rise of fake news in Africa*, 2017.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid.

<sup>81</sup> Annan, *Action Plan to Prevent Genocide*, 2004.

African Union. The Peace and Security Council recommend an intervention to the Assembly, which has the right to intervene defined in Article 4(h) in the Constitutive Act. This is complemented by the establishment of the ASF under Article 13 of the AUPSC Protocol. The ASF is inter alia mandated to carry out the intervention, while its modus operandi is approved by the AUPSC and for every operation a Special Representative and a Force Commander is appointed.

The ASF is divided into five different regional forces, however, each regional force is not on the same level of development.<sup>82</sup> Secondly, the AUPSC interprets an intervention as complied with Chapter VIII (Regional Arrangements) of the UN Charter. But it is unclear if the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) would allow a regional intervention without its authorization. It is indeed claimed that the UNSC would rather caution against it.<sup>83</sup>



Also, the fourth point of Kofi Annan’s proposals, to set up an early warning system, is facilitated in the AU Peace and Security Architecture. The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) was established under Article 12 of the AUPSC Protocol to “facilitate the anticipation and prevention of conflicts”.<sup>84</sup>

#### *Recent Communiqués of the AUPSC*

Two recent documents are mainly paving the future way of the AUPSC to deal with this topic, namely the communiqués adopted in its 678<sup>th</sup> and 761<sup>st</sup> meeting in April 2017 and April 2018. A follow-up meeting in April 2019 is already planned. The main concern addressed in those communiqués is hate crime and fake news in social media. However, no decision to directly combat this problem was taken. Indeed, the only

<sup>82</sup> African Union Independent Panel of Experts: *Assessment of the African Standby Force*, 2013.

<sup>83</sup> Aboagye, *A stitch in time would have saved nine*, 2012, pp. 2-3.

<sup>84</sup> AUPSC Protocol

decisions they took, was to assemble every April to discuss “preventing the ideology of genocide” and to specify that the official name of the Rwandan genocide should be “The 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda”. Obviously, their decisions are no milestones nor outlined approaches to decrease the risk of future genocide, because the members of the AUPSC were not able to find a compromise for a common action plan against rising hate crimes. It is now the crucial task of the AUPSC to combat the root of hate crimes and radical ideologies and ensure at the same time, that the African Standby Force is prepared for the worst-case scenario of an emerging genocide.

### **Questions an Outcome Document should answer**

1. Are Santon’s proposals to prevent genocide applicable to African countries and how can the AUPSC use his proposals?
2. How can the AUPSC prevent polarized filter bubbles and fake news in social networks?
3. How can the AUPSC ensure that they successfully intervene in a Member State in respect to grave circumstances?
4. Is the mandate to intervene complied with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and how can the AUPSC prevent that the UN Security Council cautions against an intervention?
5. How can the AUPSC standardize ASF’s regional forces? Should they prepare for possible interventions because of genocide risks?
6. Is the current procedure to appoint the ASF efficient?

## Recommend Readings

Some literature used for this Study Guide are not available in the internet, but they are not required for the debate and only deliver some historic and background information. More important is a good understanding of the AUPSC functions and current approaches to identify the risk of genocide and to decrease hate crimes.

- *Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union*. It is already mentioned in the recommend readings in Part A, but since this document is utmost important we recall our recommendation here.
- Communique in the 678<sup>th</sup> and 761<sup>st</sup> meeting of the AUPSC relating to the prevention of the ideology of genocide. Crucial documents for writing an outcome document and useful to find related documents.
- Aboagye, Festus (2012): [A stitch in time would have saved nine](#). This paper critical discusses the capabilities and problems of the African Union Standby Force.
- Del Vicario, Michaela et. al. (2016): [The spreading of misinformation online](#). Not really necessary for the discussion, but a very interesting paper about fake news if you want to dive a bit deeper into the topic and for this reason included in our recommendations.

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